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Book Reviews
LIVING LAW OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, by Jerome Hall. The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis, 1949. Pp. 146. $2.00.
Professor Hall's thesis is that the definition of positive law
should be limited to (1) norms for the exercise of State power,
(2) ethically valid and democratically ascertained, (3) but only
so far and in such manner as these norms are institutionalized so
as to be cultural fact; with all three components (formal, ethical,
and actual) being regarded as of the essence of the definition.
The little book consists of three parts, "Law and Legal Methods,"
"Law as Valuation," and "Law as Cultural Fact," augmented
versions of lectures given in 1947 at Pacific University. Its few
pages are most carefully written.
The first part of Professor Hall's definition is admittedly ex-
pressive of that traditionally referred to as "commands or rules
of conduct imposed and enforced by the sovereign." "Enforced
commands or rules" become "power norms" (hypothetical-im-
perative judgments) and "sovereign" gives way to "State." The
author's preference for his phraseology is principally fourfold.
It defines positive law in the terminology currently most in use
in the non-legal social sciences. It includes customary law,
whereas definitions in terms of "imposition of rules" or "com-
mands" exclude it. Again, it permits the clear differentiation
between positive law (State power norms) and other State norms
for the enactment, interpretation, and administration of law.
Finally, the word "State" is more inclusive of the various forms
of the subject political institution than is the word "sovereign"
with its monarchial connotation. The merits of this part of the
definition, as Professor Hall admits, are terminological rather
than substantive, for it adds nothing to the previous knowledge
of law. But language advantage can be of tremendous impor-
tance in the facilitation of legal science (the systematic exposi-
tion of the knowledge of law, which Professor Hall carefully dis-
tinguishes from law itself) and its integration with other social
sciences.
The third component of the definition is based on the idea
that positive law in its plentitude or totality cannot exist except
as a fusion of mind and fact. The contention is that the generali-
zation which is the norm (mental element) cannot have (objec-
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tive) meaning except in terms of the conduct of persons in the
presence of the norm (factual element), that law includes the
behavior in response to the normative stimulus, and that the two
cannot be separated if the full impact of the law is to be real-
ized. The contention is not merely that the meaning of a law
is difficult or even impossible to communicate fully and accu-
rately; nor is it a denial of the practical necessity, outside of
legal science, of separating the norm (formal law) from its
interpretation and application (factual, actual, or living law);
but it is that norm and fact are both elements of the law as it
exists and that legal science (not necessarily legal practice) can-
not consider the one or the other as law in its totality. Professor
Hall believes this view of positive law effectively refutes "posi-
tivism" on one extreme and "realism" on the other as theories
of the complete essence of law, and at the same time shows the
emphasis of each to be an aspect of the totality of law. As a
descriptive definition of the total effect of positive law at any
one time it is no doubt correct. This is its principal merit, for it
permits the easy inclusion of the phenomena of change in inter-
pretation and application, of desuetude and obsolescence, which
otherwise must be explained in terms which clash with the idea
of law defined formally.
It is with the bipartite second component of the definition
that the reviewer has great difficulty. Professor Hall observes
that, at least since the Stoics, ethical validity has formed a part of
the essence of positive law in all systems of jurisprudence except
those denying the possibility of ethical science. Then arguing
that moral judgments and therefore ethical science are possible,
he concludes that this insight must be correct and accepts ethi-
cal validity as essential to positive law. This must not be mis-
understood. Professor Hall does not deny that formal and even
actual State power norms may be opposed to ethical principle,
but does deny that such norms should be dignified by the term
"law."
For Professor Hall, who rejects metaphysics and (at least
for the purposes of his monograph) faith as sources of first prin-
ciples, "justice" consists of the "better answers" to moral prob-
lems, which answers become "objectively valid" if "rationally
defensible," that is, most persuasive after investigation, discus-
sion, and reflection. This of course does not provide a foundation
for ethical science, for the end toward which man should direct
his activities is not given. Nor does his observation, that law
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itself represents previous evaluations of conduct and in turn
influences subsequent evaluations, provide a guide, for an ulti-
mate criterion is still lacking. But Professor Hall seems to have
faith in method, though the purpose of the method be left un-
explained. Arguing that the current political ideal has formed,
again at least since the time of the Stoics, a part of the essence
of positive law (in the sense that such ideal should conform to
"justice," "virtue" or "natural law"), and expressing the belief
that the democratic ideal, self-rule, is the highest political form
achievable by man, he concludes that self-rule must form a part
of the essence of law. Certainly the democratic form of govern-
ment would seem to be that most consistent with man's nature.
It also may be that self-rule is less likely to lead to excesses
like Nazism or Communism, which Professor Hall dreads as
much as any person. To that extent a plea for self-rule is more
than understandable. But if I understand Professor Hall cor-
rectly, he, does not actually separate the ethical quality of law
from its democratic or non-democratic formulation. In his analy-
sis, democratically formulated law has intrinsic value because
it is the product of the form of government best suited to ascer-
tain the "best answers" to human problems; that is, because there
is no better way of ascertaining the ethically valid, law estab-
lished by truly democratic processes must be "rationally the
most defensible," and therefore "objectively valid."
In the last analysis, Professor Hall's third component must
be regarded as another of those attempts, always necessarily
futile, to construct an ethical science without first principles.
It would be better if it were not necessary to be adversely critical
of the effort of so serious a scholar as Professor Hall. But there
is no way of judging the value of any activity as human activity
(that it, not merely in terms of immediate purpose), which is
necessarily the essence of ethics, unless the purpose of man can
be ascertained. This is the province of metaphysics and faith.
Those who can accept neither must be content to remain aimless
impulses to action without right to speak of values.
ROBERT A. PASCAL*
TAX PLANNING FOR ESTATES, by William J. Bowie. Nashville: The
Vanderbilt University Press, 1949. Pp. 93, $2.00.
My own liking for this little book is shown by the fact that
I placed it on the list of books for the students in the Estate
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